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Abstract 
This paper examines the British Labour Party’s leadership election of 2015, which resulted in the 
unexpected victory of the radical-left candidate, Jeremy Corbyn. It looks at the contest using Stark’s 
(1996) academic model of leadership elections, based on the tripod of selection criteria, 
acceptability, electability and competence, and finds it wanting. Selection rules, which are 
downplayed in Stark’s model, are then examined, as Labour used a new selection system based on 
one-member-one-vote in 2015. While these are found to have had some impact, Corbyn’s victory 
cannot be explained primarily by institutions. The paper reconsiders Stark’s model and shows that it 
failed because of the diminished significance of electability as a selection criterion in the Labour 
leadership contest of 2015. That largely reflected the circumstances in which the contest took place, 
in the aftermath of a demoralising election defeat for Labour. 
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Introduction 
The British Labour Party’s leadership election of 2015 was the most dramatic in the party’s history. It 
witnessed the shock victory of a veteran left-wing candidate who had spent three decades opposing 
a succession of Labour leaders from the back-benches and who had started the contest as an also-
ran. Jeremy Corbyn’s election heralded the ascendancy of Labour’s radical-left faction, which has 
since sought to impose its own policies and strategies on the party. Labour is a world away from 
where most commentators thought it would be a year after its general-election defeat of 2015. 
 
Corbyn’s victory is of more than just curiosity value for political scientists, however. It was 
unpredicted by the standard model of leadership elections, which views contests as being 
determined by the general selection criteria of acceptability, electability and competence (Stark, 
1996). That raises the question of whether other approaches, based on the analysis of selection 
institutions, can perform better (Punnett, 1992; Quinn, 2004). Other aspects of Labour’s 2015 
contest seemingly contradict general trends identified in the academic literature. These include the 
decline in party membership – Labour’s membership doubled in 2015; and the ‘ascendancy of the 
party in public office’ – Labour’s MPs have since found themselves facing a revolt by the grassroots 
(van Biezen et al., 2012; Katz and Mair, 2002). Meanwhile, the ‘law of curvilinear disparity’, which 
predicts that activists are typically radical and MPs moderate, and which had fallen out of favour in 
Britain in recent years, now looks to have returned, with Labour’s membership surge veering to the 
left (May, 1973; Norris, 1995). Something unusual is happening in the Labour Party and it is 
important for political scientists to understand it. 
 
This paper examines Labour’s leadership election of 2015. It looks at the contest using the traditional 
model (Stark, 1996) and finds that approach wanting. However, the paper shows that, although the 
party’s selection rules, used in 2015 for the first time, did have some impact, this result cannot be 
put down entirely to institutions, as the system could easily have been used to stop Corbyn’s 
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candidacy in the first place. Neither can a general shift to the left within the party explain the 
outcome – there was a shift but not by enough to account for the scale of Corbyn’s victory. Instead, 
the paper returns to Stark’s model and explains its failure in this leadership contest by the 
diminished importance of electability as a criterion. This development was largely a consequence of 
the special circumstances in which the leadership contest took place, namely, in the immediate 
aftermath of a surprisingly decisive Labour defeat in the 2015 general election, within an intra-party 
atmosphere of electoral pessimism but also staunch opposition to the Conservative government’s 
austerity policies. 
 
Analysing Leadership Selection 
The analysis of intra-party leadership selection is a growing sub-field in political science. A 
comparative institutional literature on selection systems has emerged, examining the functioning of 
different selection rules, the contexts in which rules are changed, and the consequences for which 
types of leaders are chosen (Cross and Blais, 2012; Cross and Pilet, 2015; Kenig, 2009; LeDuc, 2001; 
Pilet and Cross, 2014). There is an extensive UK-specific literature, with cross-party studies (Bale and 
Webb, 2014; Punnett, 1992; Stark, 1996), single-party studies (Denham and O’Hara, 2008; Heppell 
,2008, 2010), and a plethora of single-contest studies (Alderman, 1998; Alderman and Carter, 1995, 
2000, 2002; Cowley and Bailey, 2000; Cowley and Garry, 1998; Denham and Dorey, 2007; Dorey and 
Denham, 2011; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011). Within this literature has emerged a theoretical 
framework for explaining the outcomes of leadership contests. Developed by Stark (1996) and 
extended by Quinn (2012), this approach questions the significance of selection systems, focusing 
instead on the criteria that selectors use. Since these criteria apply to all types of selectors, whether 
MPs, delegates or individual members, it is argued that variations in institutions rarely explain 
election outcomes. 
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Stark’s model links selection criteria to party goals. These goals are internal unity, electoral victory 
and policy implementation, in that order of importance. Only if a party were united could it hope to 
win elections, because voters generally avoid divided parties, and only after electoral victory could it 
enter government and implement policies. Party selectors seek a leader who could deliver these 
goals. If a party were divided, uniting it would take priority and selectors would typically choose the 
candidate who was acceptable, ideologically or character-wise, to a broad range of opinion. If a party 
were not deeply divided – the normal state of affairs – electability would be the key criterion, i.e. 
which candidate could deliver electoral success. If the candidates could not be distinguished on that 
criterion, the decision would turn on competence, specifically, which one would make the best prime 
minister (Stark, 1996: 126). 
 
Stark found that this framework explained most UK leadership elections from 1963-1995. In some 
cases, one candidate was strongest on all three criteria, including James Callaghan in 1976, Tony 
Blair in 1994 and John Major in 1995. In others, candidates won despite not being strongest on 
electability but where their greater acceptability proved decisive. These included Michael Foot in 
1980 and Neil Kinnock in 1983. On only one occasion did a candidate who was weaker on all criteria 
triumph – Margaret Thatcher in 1975, when she trailed William Whitelaw on all three. Stark 
explained this anomaly with reference to peculiarities of the selection rules, namely, the provision 
for second-ballot entry that persuaded most candidates to sit out the first ballot, by which time 
Thatcher had built up momentum (Stark, 1996: 127). Quinn’s analysis of UK contests from 1997-
2010 found a similar pattern, with victories for right-wing Tory candidates on the basis of 
acceptability, not electability, in 1997 and 2001. The only partial exception was Labour in 2010, 
when ballots of MPs or members would have been won by David Miliband, whereas the party’s 
electoral college, which split votes between MPs, party members and trade unionists, delivered 
victory to his brother Ed (Quinn, 2012: 161). 
 
5 
 
These contests entailed a range of selection methods, including parliamentary ballots, all-member 
ballots, hybrid parliamentary-membership ballots and electoral colleges using delegates or individual 
members (Alderman and Carter, 1995, 2002; Denham and Dorey, 2007; Pemberton and Wickham-
Jones, 2013; Punnett, 1992). That lends support to the notion that different categories of selectors 
use the same criteria and that institutions are usually of secondary importance in determining 
outcomes. However, it might not be so simple if different categories of intra-party actors were 
ideologically distinct, as per the law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973). If members were more 
radical than MPs, the two groups might interpret ideological ‘acceptability’ differently, and then 
selection systems could matter more by determining the distribution and weighting of votes. 
 
The Labour leadership contest of 2015 offers an intriguing test of Stark’s model. It seems implausible 
to claim that Corbyn was the superior candidate on the three selection criteria. As a radical-leftist 
and parliamentary rebel, he looked unable to unite his party, especially its MPs. He did not enjoy any 
obvious electoral appeal, and as a backbencher of 32 years, he did not look a likely prime minister. 
Does that mean, therefore, that a rival explanation, such as one based on the importance of 
Labour’s new selection institutions, is more appropriate? 
 
Labour’s Leadership Election 
Before analysing Corbyn’s victory, it is necessary to set out the main features of the contest, 
including the rules, the candidates and the campaign. After Labour’s defeat in the 2015 general 
election, the presiding leader, Ed Miliband resigned and a leadership election was called. Labour’s 
deputy leader, Harriet Harman, took over as interim leader but announced that she too would step 
down once a new deputy had been elected (Guardian, 8 May 2015). 
 
New Rules 
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The contest was the first to be conducted under Labour’s new selection system since its adoption in 
2014. Previously, Labour had used a tripartite electoral college that gave MPs/MEPs, party members 
and members of Labour-affiliated trade unions one third of the vote each (Quinn, 2004; Heppell, 
2010). The system controversially enabled Miliband to defeat his more experienced brother, David, 
in the leadership election of 2010. David won clear majorities of MPs and party members but Ed was 
the overwhelming choice of trade unionists and that tipped the balance (Dorey and Denham, 2011; 
Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011). The new leader faced regular questions over his autonomy from 
the unions and these came to a head during a parliamentary-selection scandal, when Labour’s 
largest affiliate, Unite, was accused of malpractice in seeking to ensure that one of its officials 
became the prospective parliamentary candidate in Falkirk (Guardian, 3 February 2014). Miliband 
responded by ordering a review of party-union links headed by a former Labour general-secretary, 
Ray Collins. 
 
The Collins Review recommended a series of internal reforms, including the abolition of the electoral 
college (Collins, 2014). In its place would come a system of one-member-one-vote (OMOV) ballots 
for leadership elections, with each party member entitled to vote. Two new categories of participant 
would be created: affiliated supporters, consisting of Labour-affiliated trade unionists who had 
signed their agreement to the party’s values and provided their contact details; and registered 
supporters, who could be ordinary members of the public not in either previous participant category 
but who signed their agreement to Labour’s values. Affiliated supporters would not need to pay any 
fee in addition to the political levies they already paid to their unions, but registered supporters 
would have to pay a small fee, which turned out to be £3 in 2015. The party hoped that individuals 
would sign up as registered supporters before considering converting to full membership, which 
carried more participation rights in intra-party activity (Collins, 2014). All three categories of 
participants would vote in a single section in leadership elections without weighted votes. The 
registered-supporters provision had the capacity to turn contests into open primaries and copied the 
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precedent of the French Socialist Party, which organised a primary (with a participation fee of €1) to 
choose its presidential candidate in 2011 (Scarrow, 2015: 189). This paper describes Labour’s new 
system as OMOV+ to capture the participation of affiliated and registered supporters alongside full 
members. 
 
Ostensibly designed to reduce trade-union influence in leadership elections, the biggest effect of the 
reform was to abolish the MPs/MEPs section. Henceforth, each MP would cast a vote equal in 
weight to that of an ordinary member, whereas in the electoral college, each MP’s vote was worth 
much more (Dorey and Denham, 2011: 293). To compensate MPs for this loss of voting power, the 
nomination threshold was increased to give them more gate-keeping power. Previously, each 
candidate for a vacant post required the nominations of 12.5% of Labour MPs. Under OMOV+, that 
was increased to 15%. As Labour had 232 MPs in 2015, each candidate needed 35 parliamentary 
nominations. 
 
The Candidates 
The contest began in May and was expected to see a Blairite-versus-soft-left battle as in 2010. 
Labour’s principal Blairite, David Miliband, was not eligible to stand because he was not an MP. 
Other plausible candidates ruled themselves out, including Alan Johnson, a former home secretary, 
and Chuka Umunna, a shadow-cabinet member, who initially announced his candidacy only to 
withdraw days later, citing press intrusion into his family life. Eventually, the Blairite mantle was 
taken up by Liz Kendall, a junior shadow minister, who criticised Labour’s performance under Brown 
and Miliband, saying the party spent too much money in government and failed to establish 
credibility on the economy and immigration in opposition. She urged a return to Blair’s centrist 
strategy to improve Labour’s electoral performance. Meanwhile, Dan Jarvis, a former special-
services soldier not associated with any faction, was mentioned as a candidate but decided not to 
run because of family pressures. Two candidates from the soft left, both former cabinet ministers 
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and senior shadow ministers, did announce their candidacies. Andy Burnham finished fourth in the 
2010 contest but hoped to do better in 2015 with support from the unions, while Yvette Cooper was 
a ‘Brownite’ and like Burnham had strong support among Labour MPs (Wintour and Watt, 2015). 
 
Labour’s radical-left faction had been excluded from intra-party power for decades and had minimal 
support among MPs. However, it had gained traction in the unions and its anti-austerity message 
chimed with many in the party. It too decided to run a candidate and settled on the 66-year-old 
Jeremy Corbyn, a veteran leftist and serial backbench rebel of 32 years. Little was expected of his 
campaign. Like many on the left, Corbyn believed Labour had lost in 2015 because it was not 
sufficiently distinct – more left-wing – than the Conservatives, especially on austerity. He also 
championed left-wing causes such as unilateral nuclear disarmament (Wintour and Watt, 2015). 
 
Corbyn’s immediate problem was overcoming the 15% nomination hurdle, given his lack of 
parliamentary support. He needed 35 nominations to get on the ballot but perhaps only 20-25 MPs 
supported him. In 2010, some moderate MPs had ‘loaned’ nominations to Abbott to ensure her 
participation (Dorey and Denham, 2011: 295). Crucially, up to 14 moderate MPs nominated Corbyn 
to ‘broaden the debate’, ensuring he reached the threshold minutes before the deadline (Guardian, 
15 June 2015). Few would have considered it consequential as the left was expected to perform 
poorly. Burnham, Cooper and Kendall each passed the threshold with ease (Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The Campaign 
As parliamentary nominations closed, there were early signs that the contest might be unusual. 
Supplementary nominations remained open for several more weeks, and it was clear that Corbyn 
had more support within the extra-parliamentary party (Table 1). He was nominated by six trade 
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unions, including the two biggest, Unite and UNISON. Both had been expected to nominate 
Burnham. Union leaders cannot deliver block votes but their endorsements can persuade trade 
unionists to support a given candidate (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011). Meanwhile, 152 
constituency Labour parties (CLPs) nominated Corbyn, more than any other candidate. 
 
To capitalise on interest in the contest, Labour announced that individuals joining the selectorate 
would be eligible to vote provided that they signed up by 12 August. It became one of the stories of 
the campaign, as Labour experienced a surge in membership. In May, individual membership stood 
at 200,000 but by August, it had climbed to 294,000. In addition, 115,000 registered supporters and 
147,000 affiliated supporters signed up. This influx strongly leaned to the left, enthused by Corbyn’s 
candidacy (see Table 5 below). Corbyn’s website provided links to Labour’s sign-up webpage and 
directed sympathisers towards it (Wintour and Watt, 2015). His supporters spread the message 
through social media to like-minded people. It reached its apogee on the final day before 
registration closed, when over 160,000 people applied, taking the total to 610,000. After eligibility 
checks, such as whether applicants were on the electoral register, ballots were eventually sent out 
to 550,000 people (BBC, 2015b). 
 
The campaign began slowly but a poll in July brought the stunning news that Corbyn led by 17% on 
first preferences under the preferential (alternative-vote) system (YouGov, 2015b). There had been 
press reports that Corbyn was being well-received in the hustings, his anti-austerity arguments and 
insistence that Labour had to offer a clear alternative to the Conservatives striking a chord with 
activists. His gentle demeanour and refusal to engage in personal attacks also won plaudits. Corbyn 
was now the front-runner, drawing criticisms from the Labour elite, such as Tony Blair, who said that 
anyone whose heart was with Corbyn should ‘get a transplant’ (Wintour and Watt, 2015). Moderate 
MPs questioned the membership influx, raising the spectre of ‘entryism’, i.e. organised infiltration of 
the Labour Party by members of far-left groups (Daily Telegraph, 23 August 2015). Labour’s 
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opponents were also enthused: a Conservative-sympathising newspaper urged its readers to sign up 
as registered supporters to elect Corbyn and ‘destroy the Labour Party’ (Daily Telegraph, 15 July 
2015). In response, the party began screening applicants for past support for other parties and 3,000 
sign-ups were excluded on this basis, although moderates insisted many more slipped through the 
net. There was even talk of a legal challenge in the event of a close result (Wintour and Watt, 2015). 
 
In the meantime, Corbyn, backed by a well-drilled campaign team that had worked for the former 
mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, spoke at a series of rallies packed out with enthusiastic young 
supporters (Wintour and Watt, 2015). As long queues formed on the streets outside his meetings, 
the press coined the term, ‘Corbynmania’. The internet and social media also played key roles in 
Corbyn’s campaign. Of particular significance was the politicking and campaigning conducted in 
online forums by ordinary supporters. The internet reduces the costs of collective action (Olson, 
1971), as can be seen with online petitions that quickly generate hundreds of thousands of 
signatures in a way that would have been impossible in the past. Corbyn supporters were mobilised 
into the Labour Party by the same means. Social media enabled contacts to be made, talking-points 
swapped, tactics coordinated and signing up to vote encouraged. Critics claimed that Corbyn’s 
supporters (not the candidate himself) also targeted opponents with abuse and intimidation 
(Independent, 12 August 2015). 
 
Overall, the campaign enabled Corbyn to build momentum and his lead increased in August, 
including among long-standing members, indicating that it was not entirely down to the influx 
(YouGov, 2015d). By then, supporters of Burnham and Cooper were urging each other’s candidate 
and Kendall to withdraw to allow a straight run at Corbyn, but to no avail. It was even proposed that 
all three should withdraw to invalidate the contest, but that idea also went nowhere (Wintour and 
Watt, 2015). Corbyn’s victory had acquired an air of inevitability. At the special conference to 
announce the result in September, Corbyn secured 60% of the vote, far ahead of his rivals (Table 2). 
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He won outright majorities of affiliated and registered supporters and nearly did the same among 
full members. A former Brownite minister, Tom Watson, was elected deputy leader, but that was 
small consolation for despondent Labour MPs (Wintour and Watt, 2015). 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Stark’s Model and the Labour Leadership Contest 
The Labour leadership election of 2015 is the clearest example of Stark’s model failing to explain the 
result of a major-party contest. Corbyn emerged victorious despite not being the strongest 
candidate on any of the three criteria of acceptability, electability or competence. Starting with 
competence, while Corbyn had the most parliamentary experience of the four candidates, he had 
the least front-bench experience. He had spent all of his 32 years in parliament as a backbencher in 
opposition to a succession of Labour leaders. He was Labour’s most rebellious MP during its time in 
government from 1997-2010, voting against his own party 428 times (BBC, 2015c). In contrast, the 
other candidates had front-bench experience, with Cooper serving 11 years in government (two in 
the cabinet) and Burnham five years in government (three in the cabinet). Cooper also held two of 
the most senior jobs in opposition – shadow home secretary and shadow foreign secretary. Kendall 
had served only in a junior role in opposition (Table 3). 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Given Corbyn’s history as a serial rebel, he also struggled to present himself as a unifier. His radical-
left views were at odds with those of most Labour MPs, although as is shown later, they were closer 
to those of many Labour selectors, particularly on the issue of austerity. Kendall’s Blairite politics 
were also out of tune with much of the party in 2015. Ever since Ed Miliband announced in 2010 that 
‘the era of New Labour has passed’, the party had sought to move beyond the image it encapsulated 
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(Bale 2015). Kendall’s 4.3% in the final vote was indicative of the diminished lustre of the Blairite 
brand. In contrast, both Burnham and Cooper appeared broadly acceptable to the party, as evident 
from their numbers of parliamentary nominations and the fact that they began the contest as the 
two favourites. Each was from Labour’s soft-left mainstream, and both accepted the need to oppose 
austerity. 
 
 On electability, the widespread presumption was that Corbyn’s radical-left ideology would be 
anathema to voters. Kendall based her campaign on electability, although questions were raised 
about her overall credibility after some weak performances during the hustings. She was rebuked by 
other candidates, including Cooper (who did not name Kendall personally), for ‘swallowing the Tory 
manifesto’ (Guardian, 31 May 2015). Burnham and Cooper were better known, more credible and 
assumed able to appeal beyond core Labour voters, although neither had the air of a clear vote-
winner in the manner of Blair in the 1990s or even David Miliband in 2010 (YouGov, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
Polling during the contest confirmed these assessments.1 A sample of selectors was asked to state 
two or three reasons for voting for their preferred candidate (Table 4). Support for Burnham and 
Cooper could be understood through the traditional selection criteria. Both scored strongly on 
opposing the Conservatives – partly a competence indicator – and on winning the 2020 election 
(electability). Burnham was strong on uniting the party (acceptability), and many of Cooper’s 
supporters also identified this motive. Kendall’s supporters associated her Blairite politics with 
electability – winning in 2020 was by far the main reason for supporting her. The interest in her 
policies and the break she offered with Miliband reflected that. Like Burnham and Cooper, she was 
rated strongly on opposing the Conservatives. 
 
Corbyn’s supporters had different selection motives altogether. Barely any mentioned electability or 
unity, and although many thought Corbyn would best oppose the Conservatives, that seemed 
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primarily to reflect his ideological stance and policy outlook. Indeed, policies were the principal 
reason for supporting him and two-thirds of his supporters cited the break he represented with New 
Labour. They were not looking for lowest-common-denominator unity or for electoral success for its 
own sake. Instead, they wanted a reorientation in Labour’s strategy. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The Effect of OMOV+ 
Stark’s model assumes that, with few exceptions, selection rules do not strongly determine the 
outcomes of leadership contests and that the winners would normally have won under other 
systems (Stark, 1996). However, the failure of the conventional approach to explain Labour’s 2015 
contest raises the possibility that institutions might have been decisive. That question is particularly 
relevant given Labour’s new selection system. 
 
To establish the effects of OMOV+ in 2015, it is necessary to determine whether the outcome would 
have been different under other systems. It seems uncontroversial to say that Corbyn could not have 
won had Labour MPs chosen the leader, as they did until 1980. He struggled to surmount the 15% 
nomination threshold and up to 14 of his 36 nominations may have been ‘loaned’ to him. It is 
inconceivable that he would have been deemed a credible candidate in a parliamentary ballot, let 
alone won. On the basis of MPs’ nominations, Burnham or Cooper would have won. 
 
Corbyn’s performance under electoral-college rules is trickier to establish although the likelihood is 
that he would have lost. Votes would have been divided evenly into three sections – MPs/MEPs, 
party members and trade unionists. Assuming party members would have voted identically to the 
full members of 2015 and trade unionists would have divided for the candidates as the affiliated 
supporters did, Corbyn would have won the first-preference votes of 49.6% of members and 57.6% 
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of trade unionists. That would have left him needing an unlikely 42.9% of MPs/MEPs to win on the 
first ballot. But what about later ballots? Using YouGov’s poll of August 2015 (which slightly under-
estimated Corbyn’s support) and taking its weighting of the transfer of votes from eliminated 
candidates to others in later rounds, it is possible to estimate final-round votes.2 If Burnham had 
faced off against Corbyn, the latter would have won an estimated 56.3% of members to Burnham’s 
43.7%, and 61.9% of trade unionists to Burnham’s 38.1%. A Corbyn-Cooper run-off would have seen 
Corbyn win an estimated 56.9% of members to Cooper’s 43.1%, and 69.3% of trade unionists to 
Cooper’s 30.7%. Therefore, Corbyn would have needed to win 31.9% of MPs/MEPs in a run-off 
against Burnham or 23.9% against Cooper to secure victory. Again, given his struggle to pass the 15% 
nomination threshold, it seems likely that Corbyn would have been defeated in the electoral college, 
despite winning in two sections – the fate of David Miliband in 2010. The knowledge that MPs would 
vote solidly against Corbyn might even have stopped his momentum building in the first place. 
 
It appears that institutions were important in 2015. OMOV+ enfranchised a selectorate that had 
decisively rejected the centrism offered by the moderate candidates. Yet few predicted that the 
membership would mobilise to the radical left. The system did not cause that surge but particular 
features of it – or the way in which they were operated – enabled it. 
 
First, the nomination rules ought to have forestalled Corbyn’s campaign. With the abolition of the 
electoral college and MPs’ loss of their voting section, the gate-keeping power of nomination was 
the only real power MPs had. Once they discarded it, they had no other means to control events. 
Second, the provision of cheap membership/registration ensured minimal financial barriers faced 
potential selectors. Third, there was no qualification period before new members/supporters could 
vote in the leadership election. The contest started in May and immediately Labour experienced a 
membership surge. As news of the registered-supporter and affiliated-supporter provisions spread, 
these too increased. There is no doubt that those who signed up after May 2015 were more pro-
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Corbyn than those who were already members (Table 5).3 YouGov’s final poll of the campaign in 
September showed that one-in-ten selectors had voted for the radical-left Green Party in the 2015 
general election, with the proportion rising to a quarter of registered supporters (YouGov, 2015e). 
Fully 92% of these ex-Greens voted for Corbyn (Kellner, 2015b). Nevertheless, the poll indicated that 
even 44% of pre-2010 members voted for Corbyn, considerably greater than Abbott’s support in 
2010. The first YouGov poll in July showed that, even among those selectors who had voted for 
David Miliband in 2010, 20-30% now supported Corbyn (YouGov, 2015b). On the other hand, these 
pre-2010 selectors constituted only a quarter of the selectorate in 2015 (Kellner, 2015b). Thus, while 
Corbyn’s victory was not only down to the influx of new selectors, they did propel his momentum. 
The increased weight and visibility of Corbyn’s support may even have encouraged longer-standing 
members who were sympathetic to Corbyn but initially doubtful of his viability to vote for him. 
YouGov (2015b, 2015e) suggested that first-preference support for Corbyn among pre-2010 
members increased from 37% to 44% between July and September. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The effect of the selection rules on Corbyn’s victory was therefore mixed. On the one hand, it is clear 
that he could not have won a parliamentary ballot and the likelihood is that he would have lost in 
the electoral college, largely because he would have fared poorly in the MPs/MEPs section. The 
removal of weighted votes for MPs undoubtedly helped Corbyn by preventing any parliamentary 
brake on his progress. Yet MPs had it within their power to keep him off the ballot in the first place; 
indeed, this power had been strengthened under OMOV+. Some MPs chose not to avail themselves 
of that power, following the precedent of 2010 when moderate MPs nominated Abbott. Her poor 
showing may even have lulled some MPs into a sense of complacency and led them to miscalculate 
Corbyn’s chances in 2015. The difference was that their own section in the electoral college gave 
MPs a second bite of the cherry in leadership contests. That no longer existed in 2015. 
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Curvilinear Disparity and the Selectorate’s Ideological Profile 
Although Corbyn’s victory was surprising, from at least one perspective, it was not completely 
unexpected. ‘May’s law of curvilinear disparity’ asserts that activists are more ‘extreme’ than MPs, 
who are ideologically closer to voters (May, 1973; cf. Norris, 1995). Therefore, if activists choose 
leaders, the latter might be more radical than if MPs chose them. Corbyn’s election in 2015 would, 
on the face of it, appear to be a straightforward confirmation of this thesis. 
 
Reinforcing this view would be the frequent observation that Labour’s selectorate had shifted 
sharply to the left since the last leadership election. The most moderate part of the electoral college, 
the MPs/MEPs section, had been removed under OMOV+ and so some shift to the left was likely. 
Additionally, the rapid influx of new members/supporters could have shifted Labour to the left. 
 
Polling data on the ideological positions of selectors in 2010 and 2015 indicates partial support for 
this argument. Figure 1 shows the left-right distribution of Labour selectors (party members and 
trade unionists, but not MPs/MEPs) according to a self-placement poll during the 2010 Labour 
leadership election. On a -100 (left) to +100 (right) scale, the mean selector self-placed at -48 (the 
average of the mean party member at -51 and the mean trade unionist at -45). Selectors’ mean 
placements of the Miliband brothers were -27 (Ed) and +1 (David), while Abbott was at -63 (YouGov, 
2010a, 2010b). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 2 shows a similar scale for the 2015 selectorate. It includes full members (who constituted 
58% of the voting selectorate), affiliated supporters (17%) and registered supporters (25%). The 
mean selector self-placed at -57, somewhat more left-wing than in 2010. The proportion of selectors 
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in the very- and fairly left-wing categories increased from 53% to 64%. Corbyn’s mean supporter was 
at -67 while selectors placed the candidate himself at -77. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
There was, therefore, a moderate shift to the left within Labour’s selectorate – a 9-point shift in the 
mean on a 200-point scale. However, there are problems with putting Corbyn’s victory down to the 
inevitable consequences of May’s law. In the 2010 contest, David Miliband won a 9-point majority 
among party members in the final count, despite these selectors being left-wing. Indeed, the mean 
selector was ideologically closest to Abbott, who came last in that election (YouGov, 2010a, 2010b; 
see also Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013). The change in the selectorate’s ideological 
composition cannot explain why the radical-left candidate won 7% in 2010 but 60% in 2015. 
Something else was happening to explain why left-wing selectors opted for moderate candidates 
(both Milibands) in 2010 but a radical one in 2015. 
 
The Diminished Appeal of Electability 
Although Stark’s model failed to explain Corbyn’s victory, the rival explanations of institutional 
determination and a shift to the left within the selectorate offered only partial answers. However, 
something had clearly changed among selectors in 2015. Left-wing preferences that were 
subordinated to electability in 2010 no longer were so in 2015. The principal change in selectors’ 
preferences, therefore, related more to strategy rather than ideology. 
 
The most notable feature of the leadership contest was the diminished importance of electability, 
the criterion that is dominant in a majority of leadership contests (Murr, 2015). It was a remarkable 
turnaround. In 2010, David Miliband was the preferred choice of party members, largely on the basis 
of his perceived electability. He was supported by many members who leaned to the left – indeed, 
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who saw themselves as more left-wing than the candidate – but who put electability above ideology 
(YouGov, 2010a, 2010b). In contrast, Corbyn’s candidacy in 2015 was not viewed primarily in terms 
of electability, even by those who supported him (Table 4). What explained the changed? 
 
It is important to understand the context in which the leadership contest occurred. A general 
election that most observers had expected to result in a hung parliament was won outright by the 
Conservatives (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016). Instead of the possibility of a minority Labour 
government, which many had thought likely, there was a majority Conservative government for the 
first time since the 1990s. Although Labour’s vote share increased marginally, the party suffered a 
net loss of 26 seats, mainly because of a near wipe-out in Scotland, where it lost 40 of its 41 seats to 
the Scottish National Party (SNP). In total, Labour won 98 fewer seats than the Conservatives. It 
marked the continuation of a trend since 2001 in which Labour’s seat share fell inexorably while the 
Conservatives’ increased (Figure 3). The SNP’s ascendancy now threatened Labour’s ability to form 
majority governments, while English voters had demonstrated a clear fear of a minority Labour 
administration propped up by the SNP (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 376-378). Meanwhile, the 
Conservatives had re-established their hegemony in England by seizing former Liberal Democrat 
seats. Labour’s road to victory in 2020 already looked arduous. 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Electorally unsuccessful parties often seek change in the direction of more effective vote-seeking 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994). That tends to be understood conventionally as a shift towards the 
ideological centre-ground (Downs, 1957). Such arguments were made within the Labour Party in the 
days following its election defeat, including by Blair and Peter Mandelson, but also newer figures like 
Umunna (Wintour and Watt, 2015). It became the key demand of Kendall’s leadership campaign. 
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The problem for the Blairites was that Labour’s declining electoral performance had coincided with 
centrist platforms. The Manifesto Project uses content analysis to code election manifestos on a 
right-left scale, where +100 is completely right-wing and -100 completely left-wing (Lehmann et al., 
2015). During 1945-92, Labour’s manifestos ranged from -48.5 to -10.3 (mean = -28.2). In contrast, 
from 1997-2010, the range was -3.1 to +8.1 (mean = +2.3). During that time, Labour’s vote share fell 
steadily from 43% to 29%. That is not necessarily to say that centrism caused Labour’s decline – 
there were many factors, including competence and leader evaluations (Whiteley et al., 2013). 
However, it was easier for the left to make the case that Labour had lost touch with its own 
supporters and that a return to traditional policies could work. 
 
For the left, Labour had become too closely associated with big business, been too prepared to 
support cuts to welfare and public services, and not willing to argue for economic growth over 
austerity. Cuts would merely take money out of the economy and deepen the recession. To the 
extent that the deficit needed to be reduced, it could be achieved through other means, such as 
collecting more taxes from the wealthy and abandoning a replacement for Trident. Labour’s fate in 
Scotland boosted the credibility of this narrative. The left argued that the party’s Scottish wipe-out 
was a consequence of the SNP’s strong opposition to austerity. Its view of Miliband’s leadership was 
that he had been led astray by Blairites, unwisely accepting the need for spending cuts and not 
distinguishing Labour from the Conservatives (Milne, 2015). 
 
Polling of Labour’s selectorate suggested that it largely accepted this analysis (Table 6). Fully 60% of 
selectors believed that Labour lost because it failed to defend the actions of the previous Labour 
government, most notably in dealing with the financial crisis and increasing public spending. 
Furthermore, 57% believed that a major reason for the defeat was that Labour had not offered an 
alternative to the coalition government’s austerity policies. Agreement was even greater among 
Corbyn’s supporters. Blairite explanations of defeat saw weaker agreement. Only 31% thought 
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Labour lost because of Miliband (19% of Corbyn’s supporters), while just 9% and 8% respectively 
agreed that being insufficiently tough on immigration and welfare, and lacking plausibility on the 
deficit were important. 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Given these beliefs about the reasons for Labour’s defeat, the selectorate was receptive to an anti-
austerity message and a break with New Labour centrism. Polls of the selectorate indicated that the 
overwhelming desire inside the party was to oppose the Conservatives on austerity. It could be seen 
by the anti-austerity positions adopted not only by Corbyn, but also by Cooper and especially 
Burnham, although the latter two undermined their credentials by abstaining with the rest of the 
shadow cabinet on the government’s welfare cuts in July 2015 (Guardian, 21 July 2015). The 
narrative of austerity had dominated the coalition’s time in office and Labour under Miliband had 
opposed many of its deficit-reduction measures, not least its welfare cuts (Bale, 2015). Polls of 
Labour’s selectorate in 2015 showed that it rejected deficit-reduction in favour of growth, opposed 
proposals to limit certain benefits to households with children, and opposed the £26,000pa welfare 
cap (Kellner, 2015c). 
 
It would not be wholly accurate to characterise this anti-austerity sentiment within the party as 
reflective of a deeper society-wide development. Polls showed that a plurality of voters supported 
deficit-reduction, and solid majorities supported the welfare cap and other benefit restrictions 
(Kellner 2015c). The radical left was able to enjoy electoral success in Greece (Syriza) and Spain 
(Podemos) on the back of popular opposition to austerity. But the unemployment rate in Greece and 
Spain in 2015 was 25.1% and 22.1% respectively, whereas in the UK it was 5.4% (HM Treasury, 2016: 
28-29). YouGov’s tracker poll on UK budget cuts from 2010-15 consistently found that about 55% of 
respondents accepted the necessity of cuts, with about 25-30% not accepting their necessity 
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(YouGov, 2016). It may be better to see Labour’s opposition to austerity as reflecting the views of 
certain sections of British society, rather than a more general sentiment. 
 
Perhaps as a consequence, the Labour left was ambivalent towards electability. Just 5% of Corbyn’s 
supporters were motivated to vote for him because he had the best chance of winning the election 
in 2020, much lower than for supporters of other candidates (Table 4). Policy was their real 
motivation: 70% supported Corbyn because of his policies and 65% because he would break with 
New Labour. Selectors were reluctant to trade-off policies for electoral success, especially when the 
latter appeared distant and elusive. A later poll asked selectors whether major parties should 
compromise on their policies to win elections (‘pragmatism’) or adopt their preferred policies even if 
they lose elections (‘idealism’). Fully 71% of Corbyn voters were idealists and 15% pragmatists, 
whereas 56% of selectors who voted for the other three candidates were pragmatists and 32% 
idealists (Kellner, 2015c). 
 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many Labour selectors, particularly those who voted for 
Corbyn, suspected that their preferred policies were electorally suboptimal. However, to cite a 
common refrain among his supporters, they believed there was little point in winning elections if 
doing so required policies they did not support (Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2015). Given that centrism 
had failed Labour in 2010 and 2015, it was time to try something else. It may be that what the party 
wanted was the immediate prospect of an effective opposition campaigning against austerity rather 
than the distant prospect of a centrist government-in-waiting. 
 
A Weak Line-up? 
One further factor undermining the centrality of electability was the uninspiring line-up of 
candidates. In 2010, David Miliband was widely seen as a strong candidate. He was a former foreign 
secretary who was well-known among voters (Dorey and Denham, 2011). In contrast, the line-up of 
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moderates in 2015 was weaker. A YouGov survey after Labour’s election defeat in May 2015 asked a 
sample of ordinary voters to say whether various declared and undeclared candidates would or 
would not make a good Labour leader (Table 7). Seven candidates were listed – but not Corbyn, 
whose candidacy was not declared or even seen as viable – and in all cases, a majority of 
respondents either did not know whether they would make good leaders or did not know enough 
about them to say. Asked which candidate would most likely lead Labour to electoral victory, 
Umunna was cited by 17% of respondents, Burnham by 14%, Cooper 8%, Hunt 3%, Kendall 2%, Eagle 
1% and Creagh 1%, but 55% replied ‘don’t know’. 
 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Although Burnham would become identified as the early favourite, his profile and appeal were 
limited to Labour members and trade unionists, not the electorate at large. Amid a weak field in 
which no-one stood out as an election-winner or prime-minister-in-waiting, the way was open for a 
more radical candidate whose analysis of what went wrong chimed with selectors’ views. Electability 
was of less significance if the party’s medium-term fate already appeared sealed. 
 
Conclusion 
The Labour leadership election of 2015 startled pundits, politicians and political scientists, with the 
landslide victory of a rank outsider. It was the biggest shock in the history of UK leadership elections, 
presenting problems for those who seek to explain such contests. Stark’s model failed, as a 
candidate who lagged behind on acceptability, electability and competence nevertheless emerged 
victorious. However, rival explanations based on institutions or the law of curvilinear disparity go 
only so far in accounting for Corbyn. Institutions mattered because MPs failed to make full use of 
their nominating powers, and while Corbyn may not have won in the electoral college, of equal 
interest was why even pre-2010 selectors were now willing to support the radical left. 
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This paper showed that the unusual downgrading of electability provides the clue as to why Corbyn 
won. Amid fierce opposition to austerity within the party at a time when its immediate electoral 
prospects looked pessimistic, selectors chose a veteran left-winger who would take the fight to the 
Conservatives. For political scientists using Stark’s approach to leadership elections, this contest held 
a lesson: a party’s desire for electability may vary, particularly in contests held in the immediate 
aftermath of electoral defeat, when the road back to government typically looks hardest. Such 
occasions also offer parties the chance to debate future policy and strategy while starting with a 
blank sheet of paper. The call to focus on electability will be but one demand among a cacophony of 
voices in the post-election period. In the case of Labour in 2015, the party decided that other things, 
such as policy, were more important. The shift in priorities was epitomised by another veteran left-
wing MP, Dennis Skinner, who had supported David Miliband in 2010. His support was not 
ideological but strategic, based on Miliband’s electability and competence (Dorey and Denham, 
2011: 305). Like many on the left, Skinner reversed his position and voted for Corbyn in 2015. 
 
A further lesson on Stark’s framework relates to the criterion of acceptability. The Labour leadership 
contest of 2015 saw party members choose a candidate completely unacceptable to MPs, reflecting 
the sharp divergence of ideological preferences of the two groups. One of the consequences of the 
three-way split in the electoral college had been that it made it difficult for either MPs or party 
members (or trade unionists) to impose a candidate unacceptable to the bulk of members of any 
other section. The removal of the MPs’ section under OMOV+ made that easier. Selection systems 
can play an important role in dictating the result when they enfranchise groups of intra-party actors 
with different views of which candidates are ideologically acceptable (Quinn, 2012: 164). 
Nevertheless, to repeat: the 15% nomination rule ought to have helped prevent the emergence of a 
candidate unacceptable to Labour MPs. 
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The victory of Corbyn joins that of Thatcher in 1975 as an instance of a non-unifying candidate 
winning the leadership of a divided party. In both cases, a majority of selectors opted for the 
candidate offering a radical break with the past in the aftermath of an election defeat (Cowley and 
Bailey, 2000). Stark’s emphasis on unity and electability underplays the extent to which parties are 
occasionally prepared to try something radically different after a period of division and failure. 
 
There is also something to be said about the importance of selection rules. Labour’s OMOV+ system 
represents an important departure in UK leadership selection. By opening the process to non-
members in the form of affiliated and registered supporters, the system effectively creates partial 
primaries. Since the 1960s, there has been a trend towards more open selection processes, including 
OMOV and a few instances of open primaries (Bale and Webb, 2014; Pilet and Cross, 2014). That 
trend extends beyond the selection of party leaders to the selection of parliamentary and sub-
national candidates (Alexandre-Collier, 2016; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Such developments may be 
justified on the basis of widening participation, but they also erode the distinction between 
members and non-members. Moreover, while opening selection to non-members may increase 
participation, there is no guarantee that it will widen it. The lesson of Labour’s experimentation with 
registered supporters is that they were ideologically skewed to the radical left. These were the 
individuals who were most enthused to become involved in the party after its election defeat, 
spotting an opportunity to reorient its ideological stance by flocking to Corbyn’s cause. Centre-
ground voters were seemingly less interested, many having just rejected the party in the election. 
The risk is perhaps less one of ‘entryism’ than of what has been pejoratively described as ‘flash-mob’ 
democracy (Rawnsley, 2015), as large unrepresentative groups of individuals suddenly sign-up and 
transform the composition of the selectorate. The possibility of that happening has increased in the 
era of social media, which has drastically reduced collective action costs. Like-minded people who 
are politically motivated can be electronically mobilised quickly and easily. Qualification periods for 
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voting rights in leadership elections could forestall destabilising influxes but they would also negate 
the purpose of primaries. 
 
Stark’s framework could not explain Corbyn’s victory but his three selection criteria nevertheless 
directed attention to the reasons why Corbyn ultimately won. The diminished salience of electability 
and divisions between MPs and members/supporters over what counted as ideologically 
‘acceptable’ were crucial factors. The new selection rules also played their role. If the experiment 
with primaries continues, then it is possible that sudden surges of new selectors similar to Labour’s 
could occur, perhaps returning parties to an earlier model (May, 1973) that pitted parliamentarians 
against the grassroots. 
 
 
 
Notes 
I thank the editors and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. He is also grateful to YouGov for kindly granting permission to make use of their data. 
1. This paper makes extensive use of YouGov’s online surveys of the Labour selectorate. Questions 
were raised about the accuracy of opinion polling after the 2015 British general election, when 
most pollsters failed to predict a Conservative majority, resulting in an inquiry by the British 
Polling Council and the Market Research Society. The problems of accurately gauging opinion 
must be acknowledged and those difficulties may be magnified when sampling a smaller group, 
such as a party’s membership. This point was noted by YouGov’s former president, Peter Kellner 
(2015a), who nevertheless recalled YouGov’s accuracy during the 2010 Labour leadership 
contest. YouGov provided the first solid evidence that Corbyn was winning in 2015 and its 
subsequent polls, based on carefully weighting the component parts of the selectorate, 
appeared accurate. However, care should be taken when interpreting polling data in this paper. 
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2. YouGov (2015d) showed Corbyn winning 49% of full members, Burnham 22%, Cooper 20% and 
Kendall 9%. In head-to-heads, the poll showed Corbyn defeating Burnham 56-44 and Cooper 57-
43. Corbyn’s transfer ratios from eliminated candidates are 7/29 against Burnham and 8/31 
against Cooper. Applying these to the actual outcomes among members (Corbyn 49.6%) gives 
Corbyn 56.3% against Burnham and 56.9% against Cooper in head-to-heads. For trade unionists, 
the poll gave Corbyn 67%, Burnham 14%, Cooper 10% and Kendall 8%. In head-to-heads, 
Corbyn defeated Burnham 72-28 and Cooper 76-24. Corbyn’s transfer ratios were 5/19 against 
Burnham and 9/23 against Cooper. These are then applied to the actual outcome (Corbyn 
57.6%). 
3. Consequently, care should be taken when comparing polling data from different stages of the 
campaign, as the selectorate was not static, but growing in size and changing in ideological 
composition between May and the close of registration in August. 
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Table 1: Nominations for Labour Leadership Candidates 
 MPs MEPs CLPs Trade unions Socialist 
societies 
Burnham 68 (29.3%) 4 111 3 0 
Cooper 59 (25.4%) 12 109 2 1 
Kendall 41 (17.7%) 2 18 0 1 
Corbyn 36 (15.5%) 2 152 6 2 
 
Sources: BBC, 2015a; New Statesman, 2015. 
Note: Not all eligible individuals/organisations nominated a candidate. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Labour Leadership Election 2015 
 Full members Affiliated 
supporters 
Registered 
supporters 
Total 
 Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Corbyn 121,751 49.6 41,217 57.6 88,449 83.8 251,417 59.5 
Burnham 55,698 22.7 18,604 26.0 6,160 5.8 80,462 19.0 
Cooper 54,470 22.2 9,043 12.6 8,415 8.0 71,928 17.0 
Kendall 13,601 5.5 2,682 3.7 2,574 2.4 18,857 4.5 
Total 245,520 100.0 71,546 100.0 105,598 100.0 422,664 100.0 
Turnout % 83.5 48.5 93.0 76.3 
 
Source: Labour Party, 2015. 
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Table 3: Political Experience of Labour Leadership Candidates 
 Years 
as MP 
Years as Govt 
frontbencher 
(cabinet) 
Years as Opp. 
frontbencher 
(sh. cabinet) 
Total years as 
frontbencher 
(cab./sh. cab.) 
Prominent frontbench 
positions 
Burnham 14 5 (3) 5 (5) 10 (8) Sec. state health 
Cooper 18 11 (2) 5 (5) 16 (7) Sec. state work & pensions; 
sh. home sec.; sh. foreign sec. 
Corbyn 32 0 0 0 None 
Kendall 5 - 4 (0) 4 (0) Sh. minister care & old people 
 
 
 
Table 4: Selectors’ Motives for Supporting Each Candidate 
  Supporters of... 
S/he... All Burnham Cooper Kendall Corbyn 
Will be best opposition to Conservatives 53 (1) 52 (1) 70 (2) 59 (4) 43 
Has best policies for country 49 29 (3) 35 (3) 36 (1) 70 
Has best policies for people like me 36 (4) 30 23 21 (3) 49 
Has best chance of winning in 2020 34 (2) 49 (2) 58 (1) 73 5 
Is a break from New Labour & Blair years 33 12 7 8 (2) 65 
Will unite party 22 (3) 48 (4) 34 10 5 
Is a break from Ed Miliband’s Labour Party 9 5 4 (4) 31 8 
 
Source: YouGov, 2015c. 
Notes: All figures % except those in parenthesis, which indicate ranking of motives for each 
candidate’s supporters, defined as respondents saying they would give first-preference vote to that 
candidate. Some motives and ‘don’t knows’ excluded from table. 
Q. Which two or three, if any, of the following are the main reasons you will vote for [chosen 
candidate]? (Select up to three) 
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Table 5: Preferences of Labour Selectorate by Time of Joining 
 All Joined selectorate 
  Since 2015 election After 2010 election Before 2010 election 
Corbyn 60 62 49 44 
Burnham 19 19 23 25 
Cooper 17 15 23 25 
Kendall 5 4 6 6 
 
Source: YouGov, 2015e. 
Note: All figures %. 
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Table 6: Selectors’ Beliefs about Why Labour Lost 2015 General Election 
  Supporters of... 
 All Burnham Cooper Kendall Corbyn 
Failed to defend the good things it did in 
government before 2010 
60 57 65 51 67 
Didn’t provide clear enough alternative to 
coalition’s austerity policies 
57 49 56 40 73 
Lost touch with working class roots 39 36 23 13 64 
Failed to answer charge that minority 
Labour govt would be propped up by SNP 
33 37 45 43 22 
Ed Miliband wasn’t good enough leader 31 34 43 51 19 
Not tough on immigration & welfare 
spending 
9 10 10 21 3 
No plausible policy for reducing deficit 8 10 9 24 3 
 
Source: YouGov, 2015c. 
Notes: All figures %. Supporters of each candidate are those respondents saying they would give 
first-preference vote to that candidate. Some reasons (cited by <10% of respondents) and ‘don’t 
knows’ excluded from table. 
Q. Here are some reasons that different people have put forward for Labour losing the recent 
General Election. Which two or three do you think were the most important reasons? (Select up to 
three) 
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Table 7: Voters’ Views of Which Candidates Would or Would Not Make a Good Labour Leader 
 Would Would not Neither Don’t know* Net ‘would’ 
Andy Burnham 22 14 8 56 +8 
Chuka Umunna 21 14 5 60 +7 
Yvette Cooper 18 20 8 55 -2 
Liz Kendall 5 9 5 81 -4 
Tristram Hunt 9 15 8 69 -6 
Mary Creagh 2 8 5 85 -6 
Angela Eagle 2 11 6 81 -9 
 
Source: YouGov, 2015a. 
Notes: All figures %. Respondents were representative sample of UK voters. 
Q. Do you think each of the following would or would not make a good leader of the Labour Party? 
* Full option was ‘don’t know, or don’t know enough about this person to say’. 
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Figure 1: Ideological Distribution of Labour Selectors in 2010 (Self-Placements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: YouGov, 2010a, 2010b. 
Notes: Selectors are Labour and trade-union members (no data for MPs/MEPs). Positions for Abbott 
and Miliband brothers are mean placements by selectors. Distributions of selectors recalculated to 
exclude ‘don’t knows’. 
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Figure 2: Ideological Distribution of Labour Selectorate in 2015 (Self-Placements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: YouGov, 2015f, 2015g (figures recalculated by author – original net figures inaccurate). 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Won by UK Parties, 1997-2015 
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